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Notes 
RETHINKING A REINVIGORATED RIGHT TO 
ASSEMBLE 
NICHOLAS S. BROD† 
ABSTRACT 
  Revived after a decades-long slumber, the First Amendment’s 
Assembly Clause has garnered robust attention of late. Endeavoring 
to reinvigorate this forgotten clause, legal scholars have outlined a 
normative vision of the assembly right that would better safeguard the 
freedom of association. This Note argues that such an approach—no 
matter its merits or its deficiencies—overlooks the Clause’s central 
aim. The assembly right is in fact best understood as an assembly 
right, not as a right about associations. This Note advances that 
proposition by closely analyzing the text and the history of the 
Assembly Clause, a project that has not yet been systematically 
undertaken. The evidence unearthed from this inquiry demonstrates 
that the Assembly Clause seeks, as its first-order concern, to protect 
in-person, flesh-and-blood gatherings. Such protection is thus 
ultimately of great import in rethinking both the freedoms afforded 
and the constraints imposed on dissent within our constitutional 
framework. 
INTRODUCTION 
The words marched across the crowd assembled in Oakland, 
California, that night, May 1, 2012: 
I hereby declare this to be an unlawful assembly and . . . command 
all those assembled to immediately leave. If you do not do so, you 
may be arrested or subject to other police action . . . which may 
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result in serious injury. . . . If you refuse to move, chemical agents 
will be used.1 
Familiar by now, the echoing threat stubbornly reminded those 
gathered of the limits to their enterprise. Most, having played their 
role in this protest ritual, retreated.2 A few hundred holdouts 
endured, clinging to glass bottles and metal shields as the police 
chased them down the street, dissenters running in the shadows of 
their city’s angry and retreating past.3 This scene was what little 
remained of Occupy Oakland, the final outpost of a dying movement 
in the city of radical America’s last refuge.4 
Protesters had once occupied Oakland, quite literally, 
constructing a veritable microcity of tents in a public park across the 
street from city hall.5 In fact, protesters occupied cities across 
America: 150 cities hosted an estimated 100,000 demonstrators on 
one Saturday in October 2011 alone.6 Tracing their roots to a 
September 17, 2011, protest in New York City dubbed Occupy Wall 
Street (Occupy),7 these widespread demonstrations captivated the 
national imagination with their vague but persistent calls for fairness, 
equality, and empowerment.8 So it was that Time pronounced “The 
Protester” its 2011 Person of the Year, declaring that “suddenly, 
shockingly . . . the protester once again became a maker of history.”9 
 
 1. Jonathan Mahler, The World Capital of Anti-Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 5, 
2012, at 37, 51. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. Oakland has long been a hotbed of revolutionary activity. See id. at 38. (“In 
Oakland, the revolutionary pilot light is always on. . . . [The] dream that still exists in Oakland 
[is] that the world can be taken from the haves and delivered to the have-nots. Like all dreams 
that are on the brink of being extinguished, its keepers cling to it with a fierceness that is both 
moving and an extreme exercise in the denial of the reality that is at their door.”).  
 4. See generally id. 
 5. See Malia Wollan, Oakland Police Clash with Fringe Protesters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 
2011, at A15 (describing “several hundred protesters” encamped downtown and one night of 
Occupy Oakland protests “that city officials estimated as at least 7,000 strong”).  
 6. Nate Silver, The Geography of Occupying Wall Street (and Everywhere Else), 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 17, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/10/17/the-geography-of-occupying-wall-street-and-everywhere-else.  
 7. See WRITERS FOR THE 99%, OCCUPYING WALL STREET: THE INSIDE STORY OF AN 
ACTION THAT CHANGED AMERICA 10 (2011) (attributing the movement’s origins to Adbusters, 
a “Vancouver-based ecological, anti-consumerist magazine” that called for protesters to flood 
lower Manhattan on September 17, 2011, under the moniker “#OCCUPY WALL STREET”). 
 8. For example, Nate Silver, who famously predicted the results of the 2012 presidential 
election, wrote about the Occupy protests on his blog, FiveThirtyEight. See Silver, supra note 6. 
 9. Kurt Andersen, The Protester, TIME (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132_2102373-1,00.html. 
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And yet, on November 15, 2011, two months after the original 
Occupy protesters pulled out their sleeping bags and set up camp in 
New York City’s Zuccotti Park, the occupation met its end.10 An early 
morning police raid cleared the park of its tents, its protesters, and 
even its makeshift library.11 Later that afternoon, the New York 
Supreme Court denied an application for a temporary restraining 
order to stop the eviction, holding that the Occupy protesters did not 
demonstrate “a First Amendment right to remain in Zuccotti 
Park . . . to the exclusion of the owner’s reasonable rights and duties 
to maintain Zuccotti Park, or to the rights to public access of others 
who might wish to use the space safely.”12 Courts across the country 
largely followed suit, upholding efforts to dismantle Occupy camps in 
the days and months that followed.13 
Leaving the protesters bereft of a physical space to situate their 
movement, these judicial opinions tested the staying power of 
Occupy’s ideas. The movement’s location in Zuccotti Park had 
enabled Occupy to engage the country in a conversation about the 
status quo: during the week of October 30, 2011, for example, news 
reports mentioning “income inequality”—one of Occupy’s central 
themes—occurred more frequently than they had during the entire 
month of August earlier that year.14 But with nowhere to go, the 
 
 10. James Barron & Colin Moynihan, City Reopens Park After Protesters Are Evicted, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/nyregion/police-begin-clearing-
zuccotti-park-of-protesters.html; see also WRITERS FOR THE 99%, supra note 7, at 177–84 
(describing the eviction from Zuccotti Park).  
 11. WRITERS FOR THE 99%, supra note 7, at 183–84.   
 12. Waller v. City of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541, 545 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
 13. E.g., Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d. 1110, 1123–24 (E.D. 
Cal. 2012); Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241 (D. Conn. 2012); 
Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11cv2657 WQH-NLS, 2012 WL 439642, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 
Feb. 10, 2012); Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 2011 WL 6747860, 
at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011); Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *1 
(D. Me. Dec. 9, 2011). But see Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 563 (D.S.C. 
2011) (granting the Occupy movement a preliminary injunction to prevent eviction from the 
grounds of the state house); cf. Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (D. Idaho 2012) 
(granting Occupy’s motion to enjoin the state from removing its tents but denying a motion to 
enjoin the state from banning overnight sleep and the storage of personal items); Occupy 
Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1066 (D. Minn. 2011) (granting in part 
a motion for a preliminary injunction brought by the Occupy movement); Occupy Fort Myers v. 
City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1340 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (same). 
 14. See Dylan Byers, Occupy Wall Street Is Over, POLITICO (Sept. 17, 2012, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/09/occupy-wall-street-is-over-135781.html (“For the 
week starting October 30, 2011, ‘income inequality’ was mentioned nearly 500 times in the news, 
more than it had been mentioned during the entire month of August . . . .”).  
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movement struggled to remain relevant.15 Nine months after Occupy’s 
eviction from Zuccotti Park, media references to income inequality 
had fallen back to their pre-Occupy levels.16 Disenchanted, the New 
York Times marked Occupy’s one-year anniversary by bleakly 
proclaiming that history would dismiss the movement as nothing 
more than “an asterisk . . . if it gets a mention at all.”17 
Why did one of America’s most prolific social movements since 
the 1960s18 evaporate so quickly? If the text of the Constitution 
matters, the First Amendment may house the answer in an 
enumerated right roundly ignored and undertheorized by courts and 
legal scholars alike. That such a right—the “right of the people 
peaceably to assemble”19—rests dust covered and dormant in an 
amendment the Roberts Court has otherwise defended with 
particular vigor20 makes its disappearance from the constitutional 
conversation all the more intriguing. 
Not so long ago, assembly featured prominently in the Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence.21 In one of the Court’s most 
celebrated opinions, Whitney v. California,22 Justice Brandeis centered 
 
 15. Social movements are, no doubt, complex organisms, and their rises and falls can never 
be precisely pinned to a specific cause. The contention here, then, is that legal battles resulting 
in the eviction of Occupy installations across the country played an important role—but 
certainly not the only role—in the movement’s loss of momentum. 
 16. Byers, supra note 14. 
 17. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Occupy Wall Street: A Frenzy That Fizzled, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Sept. 17, 2012, 8:51 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/17/occupy-wall-
street-a-frenzy-that-fizzled.  
 18. See TODD GITLIN, OCCUPY NATION: THE ROOTS, THE SPIRIT, AND THE PROMISE OF 
OCCUPY WALL STREET 5 (2012) (“The sort of sea changes in public conversation that took 
three years to develop during the long-gone sixties . . . took three weeks in 2011. At warp speed, 
all kinds of people felt that they needed to have opinions about the movement, what it was 
doing and saying, and what it ought to do and say.”). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 20. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (holding 
unconstitutional a federal statute criminalizing lies about having received, among other military 
awards, the Congressional Medal of Honor); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 
2742 (2011) (holding California’s ban on the sale or rental of violent video games to minors 
violative of the First Amendment); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (shielding 
from tort liability peaceful protesters at a military funeral on free speech grounds); United 
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (striking down a federal statute criminalizing 
depictions of animal cruelty as substantially overbroad and invalid under the First 
Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917 (2010) (striking down a federal ban on 
corporate independent expenditures on free speech grounds).  
 21. See generally John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565 
(2010) (documenting the rise and fall of the Court’s Assembly Clause jurisprudence).   
 22. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).  
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his famous concurrence on free speech and assembly, rights he 
treated as coequal for the purposes of First Amendment analysis.23 
Soon thereafter, the Assembly Clause was incorporated against the 
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 
And in more than one hundred subsequent opinions, the Court 
continued to recognize the Assembly Clause as a right related to, but 
nonetheless independent from, free speech.25 
This speech-assembly nexus dissolved in the 1950s, when the 
Court began to muddle First Amendment rights that had once been 
considered distinct. It did so primarily by introducing a new, atextual 
right to the First Amendment landscape: the “freedom of 
association.”26 At first, this newfound freedom sporadically replaced 
the right to assemble.27 But by 1958, the associational right had 
displaced assembly almost altogether.28 And, in any event, both came 
to be characterized by the Court as secondary rights enabling speech 
rather than coequal rights independent of speech.29 In the decades 
that followed, assembly withered into a mere afterthought, nothing 
more than a historical artifact.30 
 
 23. See id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“Those who won our independence 
believed . . . that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable 
to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion 
would be futile . . . .”).  
 24. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
 25. See JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 
50 (2012) (“The Court had linked these two freedoms [speech and assembly] only once before; 
after Whitney, the nexus occurs in more than one hundred of its opinions.”); see, e.g., Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (“It was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to 
freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people 
peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, 
are inseparable. They are cognate rights, and therefore are united in the First Article’s 
assurance.” (citation omitted)).  
 26. See e.g., Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 409 (1950). 
 27. Compare id. at 400 (“In essence, the problem is one of weighing the probable effects of 
the statute upon the free exercise of the right of speech and assembly . . . .”), with id. at 409 
(“[T]he effect of the statute in proscribing beliefs—like its effect in restraining speech or 
freedom of association—must be carefully weighed by the courts . . . .”). 
 28. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461 (1958) (identifying as 
“indispensable liberties” the rights of “speech, press, [and] association”). 
 29. See id. at 460 (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, 
particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has 
more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech 
and assembly.”). 
 30. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 986 (2011) (“In later 
cases [following NAACP], the Court largely followed its new approach, emphasizing 
association, not assembly, as the relevant right and treating association as subsidiary to free 
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So while individual free speech rights have expanded—the Court 
has, for example, recently struck down statutes criminalizing the 
creation of virtual child pornography31 and the production of videos 
depicting animal cruelty32—assembly rights have approached a 
vanishing point. Tellingly, in a recent Supreme Court case involving 
protests at military funerals, a paradigmatic assembly case if there 
ever was one, the word “assembly” appears not once in the text of the 
opinion.33 The cases surrounding the Occupy movement similarly 
turned a blind eye toward the assembly right: every Occupy case, 
without exception, was resolved on free speech grounds.34 The First 
Amendment’s center of gravity has shifted so far toward the 
protection of speech rights that it has been thirty years since the 
Court authored an opinion that rested, in whole or in part, on the 
Assembly Clause.35 
This approach overlooks the Constitution’s text and history. The 
Framers enshrined the right to assemble in the First Amendment for 
a reason, and that right played a critical role in shaping the nation’s 
founding.36 And yet, although the Court has gone to great lengths to 
protect unreasonable (and sometimes abhorrent) speech, it has 
adopted the polar-opposite approach in the assembly context, where 
protections for such behavior have tended to give way to the 
government’s interest in maintaining security and order.37 By casting 
the Assembly Clause aside, courts often allow the government to run 
roughshod over the ability of citizens to gather,38 a right that has long 
 
speech.”); see also INAZU, supra note 25, at 61 (“By the mid-1960s, the only cases invoking the 
freedom of assembly were those overturning convictions of African Americans who had 
participated in peaceful civil rights demonstrations.”); id. (“In 1983, the Court swept the 
remnants of assembly within the ambit of free speech law . . . .”).  
 31. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). 
 32. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). 
 33. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
 34. See infra Part III.B.2.  
 35. See INAZU, supra note 25, at 7 n.15 (“The last time the Court applied the constitutional 
right of assembly appears to have been in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 88 
(1982)—thirty years ago. A majority opinion of the Supreme Court has only mentioned the right 
of assembly six times in the past twenty years.”). 
 36. See infra Part II. 
 37. See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST 
AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES (2009) (describing the increasing regulation of 
expression in public places). 
 38. For a catalogue of judicial opinions ordering the eviction of various Occupy 
movements, see infra Part III.B.2; see also Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Clint A. Carpenter, 
The Return of Seditious Libel, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1239, 1241–42 (2008) (discussing court-
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given voice to marginalized groups, sparked dissent, and facilitated 
political and legal change.39 The way in which citizens have publicly 
practiced their politics of late should cast a renewed sense of urgency 
over the need to bring the Assembly Clause in from the cold. This 
Note submits that a reinvigorated right peaceably to assemble could 
enable movements like Occupy to make more meaningful, sustained 
contributions to our national dialogue. The First Amendment’s legal 
framework is surprisingly ill-equipped to recognize the enduring 
value of public dissent that assembly rights can contribute to our 
democracy. That should not be so. 
In an attempt to restore the right to assemble, an emerging line 
of scholarship has argued that the Assembly Clause should play host 
to a renovation of the Court’s free association jurisprudence.40 Such 
an approach suggests that assembly offers “an alternative to the 
enfeebled right of expressive association”41 and that it “guards against 
restrictions imposed prior to an act of assembling [by protecting] a 
group’s autonomy, composition, and existence.”42 Under this rubric, 
the Assembly Clause would provide a textual hook for associational 
freedom, a freedom that often manifests itself as the “freedom not to 
associate.”43 In this way, the right to assemble would blunt the force of 
antidiscrimination norms,44 which can trample group autonomy and 
force organizations to accept members whose inclusion in the group 
would “impair the ability of the original members to express only 
 
approved restrictions on assemblies near political conventions); Nick Suplina, Note, Crowd 
Control: The Troubling Mix of First Amendment Law, Political Demonstrations, and Terrorism, 
73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 412–13 (2005) (detailing restrictions on post-9/11 antiwar 
demonstrations). 
 39. See infra Part II.  
 40. INAZU, supra note 25, at 4; Bhagwat, supra note 30, at 981; cf. Tabatha Abu El-Haj, 
The Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543, 545–47 (2009) (documenting the 
historical erosion of protections under the Assembly Clause). But see Jason Mazzone, 
Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639, 713 (2002) (arguing that the assembly right can 
be exercised only insofar as it is used to petition the government). 
 41. INAZU, supra note 25, at 4.  
 42. Id. 
 43. E.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 44. See INAZU, supra note 25, at 184 (“The minimal constraints of peaceable assembly 
leave us with racists, bigots, and ideologues. They also leave us with difference. Peaceable 
assembly forces us to confront more honestly questions of what it means to live among 
dissenting, political, and expressive groups.”). 
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those views that brought them together”45—the group’s “voice,”46 as it 
were. 
This Note advances a distinctly different normative position. It 
contends that an association-based view of the Assembly Clause—no 
matter its merits or its deficiencies—overlooks the Clause’s central 
aim; that is, the right to peaceably assemble is best understood as an 
assembly right, one that protects in-person, flesh-and-blood 
gatherings like protests and demonstrations, regardless of their 
relationship to associational freedom. By looking to American 
history, legal experience, and public culture, this Note attempts to 
recapture the importance of such a distinct take on assembly and to 
sketch out the doctrinal implications of recognizing the assembly right 
for what it is. 
Part I makes the textual argument for this view of the Assembly 
Clause by presenting a new framework for analyzing the Clause’s 
language. Part II adds a historical gloss, emphasizing founding-era 
sources that have been ignored by modern Assembly Clause 
commentators. Part III analyzes the implications of such an approach 
by discussing how the Assembly Clause might be operationalized and 
how examining the Occupy movement might inform that task. 
I.  THE TEXTUAL CASE FOR ASSEMBLY 
Constitutional interpretation must begin with the text, looking to 
what the words of the Constitution meant to ordinary citizens at the 
time of the founding.47 When examining the Constitution in this way, 
no part of the text is treated as superfluous, and every word is 
 
 45. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000) 
(upholding the First Amendment right of the Boy Scouts to exclude a gay scoutmaster over a 
challenge brought under state public-accommodation laws). 
 46. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 47. This interpretive method, often called textualism, is the best place to start when 
thinking about one of the Constitution’s provisions, especially one that is undertheorized. See, 
e.g., United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931) (“The Constitution was written to be 
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as 
distinguished from technical meaning . . . .”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 188 
(1824) (“[T]he enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted 
it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended 
what they have said.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 16 (1980) 
(“[T]he most important datum bearing on what was intended is the constitutional language 
itself.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 903 (1985) (“The Philadelphia framers’ primary expectation regarding constitutional 
interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal document, would be interpreted in 
accord with its express language.”). 
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assumed to carry independent weight where possible.48 An analysis of 
the Assembly Clause should first be conducted with these guiding 
principles in mind. 
The few scholars who have attempted this inquiry have started 
with the syntax of the First Amendment.49 But this approach skips a 
crucial step: understanding what the individual words of the 
Assembly Clause meant to the founding generation.50 The Assembly 
Clause contains an infinitive, a phrase, and an adverb that merit close 
scrutiny: the substantive right itself, “to assemble”; those to whom the 
right is afforded, “the right of the people”; and a qualification, 
“peaceably.”51 
A. The Language of the Assembly Clause 
1. “To assemble.”  The founding-era meaning of the verb 
“assemble” largely resembles our common understanding of the word 
today. Dictionaries at the time defined it as “[t]o meet together,”52 “to 
flock together,”53 and “to convene, as a number of individuals.”54 
These definitions provide a helpful starting point for assessing 
the scope of the assembly right. The plain meaning of the word 
indicates that the act of assembling, as originally understood, involved 
face-to-face meetings of individuals, a kind of calling or getting 
together that existed regardless of long-term associational ties. 
Indeed, the verb “assemble” does not encompass acts of forming, 
establishing, or maintaining a group; instead, its emphasis in 
 
 48. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a construction is 
inadmissible, unless the words require it.”).  
 49. INAZU, supra note 25, at 21–23; Mazzone, supra note 40, at 712–13. 
 50. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To Execute the 
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 553 (1994) (noting that this methodology requires both “a dictionary 
and a grammar book” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 552 n.35 (“Language is a social 
invention, and thus meaningless without access to those external sources, such as dictionaries, 
that explain the rules as to how a particular language is used.”).  
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 52. 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. 
Rivington et al. 6th ed. 1785).  
 53. 1 TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (London, J.F. 
& C. Rivington et al. 3d ed. 1783).  
 54. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (New 
Haven, S. Converse 1828); see also NATHAN BAILEY, AN UNIVERSAL ETYMOLOGICAL 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Edinburgh, Neill & Co. 25th ed. 1783) (defining “to assemble” as “to 
call, gather, meet, or get together”).  
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founding-era dictionaries lies in notions about flesh-and-blood, heat-
of-the-moment gatherings of individuals irrespective of an overriding 
group identity. In this sense, the assembly right may be best 
conceptualized as protecting “the occasional, temporal gathering that 
often takes the form of a protest, parade, or demonstration”55—
whether that physical gathering has anything to do with an association 
or not.56 
This conclusion finds additional support from an intratextual 
approach to the verb “assemble.”57 The word also appears in Article I, 
Section 3; Article I, Section 4; the Twentieth Amendment; and twice 
in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.58 In each instance, assembly refers 
to an in-person gathering of a legislative body.59 Article I, Section 3, 
for example, mandates that once two senators have been chosen from 
each state,60 they must be “immediately” assembled after the first 
election.61 Article I, Section 4 requires that Congress assemble at least 
once per year, and it provides a specific date for when that gathering 
must take place.62 The Twentieth Amendment, which modified the 
date provided by Article I, Section 4, even went so far as to specify 
 
 55. INAZU, supra note 25, at 2. 
 56. An association can assemble, of course. But the Assembly Clause protects the physical, 
in-person right to gather, which means that its protections can also extend to heat-of-the-
moment, spontaneously formed groups devoid of a long-term identity, that is, groups that are 
not in any real sense associations. 
 57. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999) (“In 
deploying this technique, the interpreter tries to read a contested word or phrase that appears in 
the Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very 
similar) word or phrase.”).  
 58. Intratextualism remains a valid interpretive mechanism despite time lapses in 
codification. Cf. id. at 791 (“[T]he Constitution itself provides a common reference point for all 
concerned: drafters composing constitutional language, ratifiers deciding whether to make such 
language supreme law, . . . and subsequent generations of would-be amenders seeking to add 
postscripts to the prior text.” (footnote omitted)). 
 59. True, the Constitution’s other references to the verb “assemble” all relate to meetings 
of legislative bodies. But that fact need not cabin the reach of the intratextual argument. After 
all, the First Amendment specifies that the right to assemble is a right “of the people,” not one 
afforded to only elected representatives. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). For a 
discussion of this language, see infra Part I.A.2.  
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2 (“Immediately after they [two senators from each state] 
shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may 
be into three Classes.”). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, 
and such Meeting shall be on the First Monday in December . . . .”). 
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the time when the congressional assembly must meet.63 And the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s two references to assembly are similarly 
temporal in nature: Congress must, for instance, assemble within 
forty-eight hours to determine whether the President is incapacitated 
upon such a declaration by the Vice President and the Cabinet.64 
When coupled with the definition of “assemble” contained in 
founding-era dictionaries, these intratextual references indicate that 
the Constitution embodies an understanding of the assembly right 
whose first-order concern is with physical, in-person gatherings. 
2. “The right of the people.”  That the assembly right is “the right 
of the people” lends further credence to this interpretation. The 
meaning of “the right of the people” as it appears in the Bill of Rights 
has been considerably contested.65 This exact phrase appears two 
other times in the Constitution’s text: in the operative clause of the 
Second Amendment66 and in the Search and Seizure Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment.67 Moreover, the words “the people” are also 
featured in the Preamble;68 Article I, Section 2;69 the Ninth 
Amendment;70 and the Tenth Amendment.71 An intratextual 
approach, once again, is thus helpful to better understand the phrase’s 
meaning. 
 
 63. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX (changing this date to “noon on the 3d day of January” but 
preserving the use of “assemble” in Article I, Section 4, clause 2). 
 64. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV (“Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue [whether the 
President is incapacitated], assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in 
session.”); see also id. (noting that “Congress is required to assemble” to make such a 
determination). 
 65. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (“Nowhere else in the 
Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the people’ refer to anything other than an individual 
right.”), with id. at 645 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the phrase “contemplate[s] 
collective action”). 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 68. U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People . . .”).  
 69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of 
Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”). 
 70. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall 
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).  
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”).  
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The Court has read references to “the people” in all six of these 
provisions as “unambiguously refer[ring] to all members of the 
political community, not an unspecified subset.”72 Thus, the right to 
assemble should be afforded to all members of the constitutional 
community, not to just a select few. The Court has also held that such 
references, when used to refer to the exercise of rights (as they do in 
the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments), guarantee an 
individual, as opposed to a collective, right.73 Intratextual references 
to “the right of the people” and “the people” in the context of 
constitutional rights thus demonstrate that the Assembly Clause is an 
individual, not a collective, right. Indeed, as Justice Scalia has written, 
although “the right to assemble cannot be exercised alone . . . it is still 
an individual right, and not one conditioned upon membership in 
some defined ‘assembly.’”74 
This observation is overlooked by those scholars who advance a 
theory of the assembly right premised on group membership and 
autonomy.75 In fact, an intratextual analysis demonstrates that the 
assembly right is not necessarily aimed at protecting associational 
identity, but rather at facilitating individual participation in a physical 
collective with others, regardless of whether that activity is connected 
with a formally constituted group. In this way, the Assembly Clause 
can protect gatherings unmoored from deeper associational aims. 
References to “the people” in the context of constitutional 
powers are not entirely unavailing as a source of intratextualism, 
however. As Professor Alexander Meiklejohn has famously observed, 
the Preamble; Article I, Section 2; and the Tenth Amendment all 
speak to the value of popular sovereignty and self-government, 
holding important clues to the animating rationale behind the 
Assembly Clause and the First Amendment.76 The Preamble’s 
reference to “the people,” for example, identifies the authority to 
govern the people as “belong[ing] to the people themselves, acting as 
 
 72. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008). 
 73. See id. at 579–80 (noting that “the people” in the Preamble, Article I, Section 2, and the 
Tenth Amendment “arguably refer to ‘the people’ acting collectively—but they deal with the 
exercise or reservation of powers, not rights”).  
 74. Id. at 579 n.5.  
 75. See, e.g., INAZU, supra note 25, at 21 (arguing that the right to assemble often 
“extend[s] beyond an expressive moment to protect the group that made that expression 
possible”).  
 76. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 
253–54. 
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members of a corporate body politic.”77 The Tenth Amendment 
places a similar emphasis on self-government, reminding us that “the 
people” reserve for themselves the powers they do not delegate.78 
And Article I, Section 2 speaks to yet another “reserved power,” the 
power to vote, “[in] which the people, as an electorate, actively 
participate in governing both themselves . . . and their agencies.”79 
Surveying these internal references suggests that the Assembly 
Clause—and perhaps the First Amendment itself—has as one of its 
central themes the idea that “[p]olitical freedom is not the absence of 
government. It is self-government.”80 
3. “Peaceably.”  Founding-era dictionaries defined the adverb 
“peaceably” as “without tumult,”81 “without disturbance,”82 “opposite 
to war or strife,”83 and “quietly.”84 These definitions also support a 
reading of the Assembly Clause that focuses more on physical 
gatherings than on metaphysical associations. This proposition is 
supported by the fact that, given its plain meaning, the term 
“peaceably” does not align well with the type of activities that would 
be protected by associational freedoms. An association-based view of 
the assembly right, for example, might encompass “the ability to 
decide on the membership of permanent organizations,” including 
“activities like filing papers and setting up by-laws to which the 
adverb ‘peaceably’ does not seem to apply at all.”85 
At bottom, “peaceably” appears to act as a limitation on the 
right to assemble, one informed by the potential for assemblies to 
devolve into mobs or to serve as a vehicle for organizing criminal 
conduct.86 Scholars have offered several suggestions for giving 
substance to this built-in restriction. Some have drawn from the 
 
 77. See id. at 253 (discussing passages of the Constitution regarding “the people”).  
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 79. Meiklejohn, supra note 76, at 254.  
 80. Id.  
 81. 2 JOHNSON, supra note 52. 
 82. 2 THOMAS SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
(London, Charles Dilly 4th ed. 1797). 
 83. 2 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 53 (defining the noun “peace”). 
 84. BAILEY, supra note 54; see also 2 WEBSTER, supra note 54 (defining “peaceably” as 
“without agitation; without interruption”). 
 85. Richard A. Epstein, Forgotten No More, ENGAGE, Mar. 2012, at 138, 139 (reviewing 
INAZU, supra note 25).  
 86. For a historical discussion, see infra Part II.C.2. 
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Court’s free speech jurisprudence to operationalize the term,87 which 
would prohibit the state from restricting the assembly right unless 
such activity “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”88 Others, 
however, have cautioned against using the test for incitement in the 
assembly context, recognizing that “groups are more dangerous than 
individuals when it comes to advocacy of violence.”89 
That said, this discussion assumes that the word “peaceably” 
functions as a restriction on the Assembly Clause in the first place. 
But an alternative reading exists that modern scholarship has ignored: 
that “peaceably” acts as a guarantee, not as a limit. Suppose that an 
instructor promises her students that they have a right “peaceably to 
complete the exam.” She may very well mean that her students have a 
right to finish their exams so long as they do so quietly, without 
disturbance. She may also mean, however, that her students have a 
right to finish their exams free from any noise or disturbance, a 
condition she is obligated to ensure. Looked at this way, the 
Assembly Clause promises those gathered that they may do so 
without interference from external pressures, that they have a right to 
assemble in peace, a condition that the government—much like the 
teacher in the hypothetical above—bears the burden of safeguarding. 
This reading could mean that the Assembly Clause embodies 
both a positive and a negative right.90 As a negative right, the 
Assembly Clause would function like any other First Amendment 
freedom: it would shield the assembly right from government 
abridgement. As a positive right, the Assembly Clause could impose 
an affirmative obligation on the government to protect assemblies 
from external and internal violence; it could also obligate the 
government to hold open certain public spaces for protests and other 
in-person gatherings.91 Regardless of the specific approach, this 
interpretation would create an Assembly Clause both “‘regulated’ 
 
 87. INAZU, supra note 25, at 166–67. 
 88. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).  
 89. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty’s Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of the 
Right of Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1381, 1394 (2012). 
 90. The First Amendment is traditionally thought to encompass only a negative right. After 
all, it speaks exclusively in negative terms: “Congress shall make no law . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (emphasis added). The contention here is that the term “peaceably” makes a strictly 
negative interpretation—of the Assembly Clause, at least—inconsistent with the text. Cf. David 
P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 872–80 (1986) 
(cataloging potential positive constitutional rights and their limits). 
 91. See infra Part III.B.4. 
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and ‘free,’”92 jibing with the founding-era understanding of the adverb 
“peaceably” by ensuring that assemblies occur without “tumult” or 
“disturbance,”93 broadly understood. 
Indeed, this interpretation suggests a physicality to the way in 
which the act of assembling is practiced; that an assembly must be 
both regulated and free are two conditions to be secured on the spot, 
with access to land94 or with police protection to guard the assembly 
from violence.95 The concern here is not so much with associational 
identity as it is with securing the conditions necessary for an in-person 
gathering to take place in the first instance, yet another clue that the 
nature of the assembly right has more to do with facilitating flesh-
and-blood gatherings than with protecting the freedom of associations 
to choose their members. 
B. The Syntax of the First Amendment 
Having analyzed the words of the Assembly Clause, it is now 
appropriate to turn to the larger context in which that Clause 
operates: the text of the First Amendment. In its entirety, the First 
Amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”96 
The rights outlined in the First Amendment are no doubt 
interrelated,97 but a reading of the Assembly Clause that casts it as 
merely enabling speech would render the Clause superfluous. The 
text alone should be enough to support this argument: because no 
“clause in the [C]onstitution is intended to be without effect,”98 
speech and assembly must be separate, independent rights. 
Assuming the right to assemble is independent from the right to 
free speech, the text then raises the question of whether the First 
Amendment protects a freestanding right to assemble, or whether 
 
 92. Meiklejohn, supra note 76, at 259. 
 93. See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text.  
 94. See infra Part III.B.4. 
 95. Meiklejohn, supra note 76, at 260. 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 97. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (noting that although the rights secured 
by the First Amendment are not “identical,” they are nonetheless “inseparable,” “cognate 
rights”).  
 98. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).  
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that right exists only insofar as it is exercised to petition the 
government. Professor Jason Mazzone has argued that the right to 
assemble is guaranteed only to petition the government.99 He cites 
two pieces of evidence in the grammatical structure of the First 
Amendment to support this proposition. First, he observes a 
distinction between “the use of [the words] ‘and to petition,’ which 
contrasts with the use of ‘or’ in the remainder of the First 
Amendment’s language.”100 Professor John Inazu, however, 
persuasively argues that “the comma preceding the phrase ‘and to 
petition’ is residual from the earlier text that had described the ‘right 
of the people peaceably to assemble and consult for their common 
good, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.’”101 
Inazu goes on to argue that this comma, left intact despite the 
deletion of the qualification “for their common good,” demonstrates 
that the Framers sought to distinguish the right to assemble from the 
right to petition.102 
Mazzone’s second argument proves similarly unavailing. He 
notes that the right to assemble is conditioned on the right to petition 
because the Assembly Clause refers to a “right” (singular), as 
opposed to “rights” (plural), indicating a single right to assemble in 
order to petition the government.103 This reading tracks the pre-
incorporation interpretation of the Assembly Clause, in which the 
Court held that “the right peaceably to assemble [is] not 
protected . . . unless the purpose of the assembly [is] to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.”104 It is an approach that has 
long since been discredited by the Court. In fact, “[s]tate constitutions 
of the founding period routinely grouped multiple (related) 
guarantees under a singular ‘right,’”105 and the First Amendment is 
 
 99. Mazzone, supra note 40, at 713. 
 100. Id. at 712.  
 101. INAZU, supra note 25, at 23 (emphasis added).  
 102. See id. at 23 n.7 (“Mazzone addresses the comma in a footnote and argues that because 
it ‘mirrors the comma’ preceding the words ‘or prohibit the free exercise thereof’ in the first half 
of the First Amendment, ‘it does not therefore signal a right of petition separate from the right 
of assembly.’ The argument for textual parallelism doesn’t hold because the free exercise clause 
explicitly refers back to ‘religion’ (before the comma) with the word ‘thereof.’ A close parallel—
which illustrates the problem with Mazzone’s interpretation—is the suggestion that the comma 
separating speech and press connotes that they embody only a singular freedom.” (citation 
omitted) (quoting Mazzone, supra note 40, at 713 n.392)). 
 103. Mazzone, supra note 40, at 712–13.  
 104. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 267 (1886). 
 105. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008). 
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now thought to “protect[] the ‘right [singular] of the people peaceably 
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.’”106 
C. The Textual Synthesis 
The textual evidence, viewed as a whole, thus demonstrates that 
the Assembly Clause is both independent and in person. It is 
independent in the sense that the assembly right, based on the 
grammar of the First Amendment, stands on its own, distinct from 
other rights to free speech, press, and petition. It is in person in the 
sense that the words of the Assembly Clause, as originally 
understood, were crafted to protect physical gatherings. In this way, 
the First Amendment does not house a generalized freedom of 
assembly, but rather a right to peaceably assemble, one that is both 
regulated and free. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL CASE FOR ASSEMBLY 
Lessons from the Assembly Clause’s text in hand, this Note now 
turns to how the right to peaceably assemble has been historically 
understood.107 This inquiry aims to illuminate the “original public 
meaning [of] the text,”108 recognizing that it represents “the 
expression of a collective decision: a decision made by the established 
political authority and expressed in a form recognized as conferring 
 
 106. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I); see also INAZU, supra note 
25, at 40 (“Presser is the only time that the Supreme Court has expressly limited the right of 
assembly to the purpose of petition, and the Court has since indirectly contradicted the view 
that assembly and petition compose one right. But [this] mistake has been followed in decades 
of scholarship.”); cf. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 409 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The 
First Amendment] has not generally been thought to protect the right peaceably to assemble 
only when the purpose of the assembly is to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”); JAMES E. LEAHY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 1791–1991: TWO HUNDRED YEARS 
OF FREEDOM 202 (1991) (“The final wording of the First Amendment indicates that the first 
Congress intended to protect the right of the people to assemble for whatever purposes and at 
the same time to be assured of a separate right to petition the government if they chose to do 
so.” (emphasis added)). Where, then, does this analysis leave the Petition Clause? At least one 
piece of scholarship has argued that the right to petition is, like the right to assemble, a 
freestanding First Amendment right whose contours have long been ignored by courts. 
Krotoszynski & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 1246. A discussion of the precise meaning of that 
clause, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 107. This Note does not purport to adopt a strict “hierarchy of originalist source materials.” 
See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 50, at 552. Suffice it to say that, given the undertheorized 
nature of the Assembly Clause, history provides a useful tool in thinking about the right. 
 108. Id. at 553.  
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legal force and validity upon the decision.”109 Modern investigations 
of the Assembly Clause have focused most of their attention on 
postenactment history.110 Arguably, this evidence is “the least reliable 
source for recovering the original meaning of the [text]”111 because 
“there can be no guarantee that a later lawmaker’s understanding in 
fact bears on the intent animating an earlier enactment.”112 As a 
result, this Note seeks to chart a different course in documenting the 
history of the Assembly Clause by looking more closely at pre-
founding and founding-era conceptualizations of the assembly right. 
A. Assembly in English Common and Statutory Law 
The right to assemble has deep historical roots that predate the 
founding. Both English common and statutory law recognized the 
right to assemble.113 Under Queens Mary I and Elizabeth I, a 
comprehensive set of statutes were passed regulating assemblies that 
afforded justices of the peace the authority to “disperse a group 
assembly if in their opinion it was, or could well lead to an unlawful 
gathering.”114 In so doing, the justices were to approach the assembly 
as closely as possible and read a proclamation ordering the assembly 
to disband.115 
References to assembly were not entirely limited to legal 
regulations surrounding the gathering of individuals. The word 
 
 109. Steven D. Smith, Correspondence, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 111 
(1989).  
 110. See, e.g., INAZU, supra note 25, at 26–62 (documenting assemblies and associations 
throughout American history); cf. El-Haj, supra note 40, at 554–61 (detailing the nineteenth-
century understanding of the right to assemble in public streets). But see INAZU, supra note 25, 
at 21–25 (describing House debates surrounding the meaning of the Assembly Clause).  
 111. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 50, at 553.  
 112. Id. at 554. 
 113. At common law, the assembly right was distinguished from an unlawful assembly, 
which was defined as the “company of three persons (or more) gathered tog[e]ther to do[] such 
an unlawful[] act[], although[] they do it not in deed[].” WILLIAM LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA: OR 
OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF PEACE 175 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., Prof’l Books Ltd. 1972) 
(1582); see also CUNNINGHAM, supra note 53 (defining an unlawful assembly as “the meeting of 
three or more persons to do an unlawful act, although they do it not”); George P. Smith, II, The 
Development of the Right of Assembly—A Current Socio-Legal Investigation, 9 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 359, 362 (1967) (“In passing on a question of assembly, the jurists [at English common law] 
usually found it necessary to consider both the intent and purpose of those assembled and 
whether their behavior was such that it terrorized the other people in the area who were not 
participating in the assembly.”). 
 114. Smith, supra note 113, at 363 n.19.  
 115. James M. Jarrett & Vernon A. Mund, The Right of Assembly, 9 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 5, 8 
(1931). 
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“assembly” also carried political connotations, and the English 
frequently used it in reference to meetings of legislative bodies or 
popular conventions. Blackstone, for example, described the British 
Parliament during the English Revolution of 1688 as “assembl[ed]” in 
“a convention.”116 Historian Gordon Wood has noted that political 
conventions “were closely allied in English thought with the people’s 
right to assemble.”117 It should come as little surprise, then, that many 
of the Constitution’s references to the act of assembling involve 
meetings of Congress.118 
The origin of the assembly right in English common and 
statutory law demonstrates an understanding of assembly focused on 
in-person, often politically oriented gatherings. Laws regulating these 
assemblies outlined the conditions under which authorities could end 
an assembly considered dangerous to public order, including its size 
and its alleged purpose. But assembly carried a deeper meaning as 
well—one that touched on politics and popular sovereignty. 
Regardless, the right to assemble in all of its manifestations 
concerned in-person, physical gatherings, whether connected to an 
association or not. 
B. Assembly and the Debates of the First Congress 
The debates in the First Congress over the Bill of Rights119 
demonstrate that the English legal tradition was very much on the 
minds of the founding generation while drafting the Assembly Clause. 
When Representative Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts 
contended that the Assembly Clause was “self-evident,”120 a right 
 
 116. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151–52 (noting both that “the peers 
might assemble” and that “the lords and commons . . . met in a convention”). 
 117. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 312 (1969). For an 
example of this link in founding-era documents, consider the founding-era constitution of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, which sets “[a] declaration of rights made by the representatives of 
the good people of Virginia, assembled in full and free convention . . . as the basis and 
foundation of government.” See VA. CONST. OF 1776 (Declaration of Rights), pmbl., reprinted in 
7 FRANCIS N. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3812 (1909).  
 118. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 119. The debates of the First Congress are widely regarded as a legitimate historical source 
for interpreting the various provisions of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 50, at 555 (“Th[e] use of the First Congress’ actions to shed light on the meaning of the 
Constitution [is helpful as a matter of constitutional interpretation] because the First Congress 
played a role in creating the Bill of Rights when it proposed the first ten amendments to the 
states . . . .”).  
 120. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 731 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
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“that would never be called into question,”121 Representative John 
Page of Virginia responded with an allusion to the type of 
government suppression from which the Framers had fled: “A man 
has been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before the face 
of authority; people have also been prevented from assembling 
together on their lawful occasions.”122 
Most citizens would have recognized this statement as a 
reference to the trial of William Penn, a Quaker widely known 
throughout England and the American colonies as having been 
charged with engaging in an unlawful assembly when he delivered a 
sermon to Quakers on a London street.123  Of course, one isolated 
exchange about the Assembly Clause can hardly serve as the lynchpin 
for how that right ought to be understood. But to the extent that 
Penn’s trial was an influential story for the First Congress when 
drafting the Assembly Clause, it indicates that the Framers did not 
intend to restrict the assembly right to a certain subject. Penn’s 
conduct had nothing to do with petitioning the government, or even 
with politics; a religious purpose animated his gathering, a gathering 
that Representative Page nonetheless characterized as an assembly.124 
Whether Penn’s ordeal has anything to say about the validity of a 
broader associational view of assembly is less clear. Authorities 
charged Penn with violating the common law prohibition against 
unlawful assembly,125 and Penn’s jury trial focused largely on the 
meaning of the assembly charge, an offense that at the time had little 
to do with associational rights. 
Over Penn’s protestations, the recorder at his trial specifically 
instructed the jury that Penn’s indictment was for “drawing a 
tumultuous company.”126 After deliberating, the jury delivered a 
 
 121. Id. Representative Sedgwick proposed striking the Assembly Clause from the First 
Amendment altogether, finding the proposal of such a right “derogatory to the dignity of the 
House.” Id. When put to a vote, the House rejected the proposal by a large majority. Baylen J. 
Linnekin, “Tavern Talk” and the Origins of the Assembly Clause: Tracing the First Amendment’s 
Assembly Clause Back to Its Roots in Colonial Taverns, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 593, 611–12 
(2012). 
 122. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 732; see also INAZU, supra note 25, at 23–24 (describing the 
exchange between Representatives Sedgwick and Page). 
 123. INAZU, supra note 25, at 24. 
 124. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 732. 
 125. Trial of William Penn & William Mead (Old Bailey 1670), in 2 STATE TRIALS 610 
(London, 3d ed. 1742). 
 126. Id. at 613. 
BROD IN PRINTER PROOF (FN CORRECTION) (DO NOT DELETE) 9/18/2013  8:40 AM 
2013] RETHINKING THE ASSEMBLY CLAUSE 175 
verdict of “[g]uilty of speaking in Gracechurch Street,”127 to which one 
of the presiding judicial officers incredulously asked, “Was it not an 
unlawful [a]ssembly? [Y]ou mean he was speaking to a [t]umult of 
[p]eople there?”128 When the foreman responded in the negative, the 
judge, frustrated and displeased, forced the jury to reconsider its 
verdict, but for a second time, it found Penn guilty of speaking, not 
assembling.129 Upon threatening to lock up the jury for its ostensibly 
incorrect verdict, the judge found himself interrupted by Penn, who 
marshaled his best defense against the assembly charge, arguing that 
“[t]he [j]ury cannot be so ignorant as to think, that we met there, with 
a [d]esign to disturb the [c]ivil [p]eace . . . we are a peaceable 
[p]eople, and cannot offer [v]iolence to any [m]an.”130 
Both the indictment and Penn’s defense focused on assembly as 
an in-person act: a gathering in the street, the legal significance of 
which turns not on who is there or why they have met but on how 
they have gathered and whether their union threatens public order or 
harbingers tumult. Understood this way, the story behind Penn’s trial 
does not reveal much about the validity of an association-based view 
of assembly rights; instead, it demonstrates that assembly was, first 
and foremost, a right protective of face-to-face meetings, protests, 
and demonstrations.131  That said, it would be a mistake to forget the 
larger theme lurking behind this narrative: that the Framers had 
dissent in mind when drafting the Assembly Clause. To the extent 
that Penn’s trial was instructive in developing a rationale for the 
Assembly Clause, it reveals that the assembly right was designed, at 
least in part, to protect gatherings that ran against the status quo, 
even if their message was not inherently political. 
In addition to debating the need for an Assembly Clause, the 
First Congress also debated the language of that clause as it appeared 
in initial proposals for the Bill of Rights that were submitted by state 
ratifying conventions.132 North Carolina133 and Virginia,134 for example, 
 
 127. Id. at 614 (emphasis altered). This distinction adds additional support to the contention, 
made earlier, that assembly and speech should be thought of as separate, independent rights. 
See supra Part I.B.  
 128. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 614.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 132. James Madison described the Constitution as “nothing but a dead letter, until life and 
validity were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the several State 
Conventions.” 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 776 (1796). 
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limited the right of the people to assemble only for “the common 
good.” James Madison’s 1789 proposal to the House employed a 
slightly different restriction, limiting the right to assemble to those 
pursuing “their common good.”135 The House approved this latter 
version of the Assembly Clause on August 24, 1789, but Madison’s 
restriction was mysteriously dropped after the Senate added the 
religion clauses into the First Amendment.136 
Professor Inazu has argued that this drafting history reveals that 
the text “does not limit the purposes of assembly to the common 
good, thereby implicitly allowing assembly for purposes that might be 
antithetical to that good.”137 This theory may be an accurate historical 
interpretation, but it is impossible to discern the exact meaning 
behind the nonadoption of a proposed constitutional provision. The 
decision to exclude the words “for their common good” could 
indicate that the Framers, by their silence, decided to explicitly reject 
that provision; it could also mean, though, that the Framers assumed 
that the words of the Assembly Clause compelled such a reading in 
the first place. Professor Inazu’s take, however, tends to corroborate 
the primary lesson illuminated by Penn’s trial: that protecting dissent 
colored the motivation behind the Assembly Clause, even if the 
Clause was thought to extend primarily to in-person gatherings. 
C. Assembly’s Historical Backdrops 
Given the relative paucity of evidence that can be gleaned about 
the Assembly Clause from the debates of the First Congress, it is 
useful to analyze the broader historical environment in which the 
Clause was written. 
1. State Constitutions.  The state constitutions that began to 
emerge in 1776 played a central role in shaping the Federal 
Constitution, especially the Bill of Rights.138 Every right eventually 
protected by the Bill had previously found sanctuary in the text of at 
 
 133. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 244 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901). 
 134. 3 id. at 658–59. 
 135. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434. 
 136. INAZU, supra note 25, at 23. 
 137. Id. at 25.  
 138. See Donald S. Lutz, The States and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 251, 262 
(1992) (“[T]he very idea of a written bill of rights attached to a constitution, as well as the 
content of the U.S. Bill of Rights, developed first at the state level.”). 
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least one state constitution.139 The centrality of the state constitutional 
experience, then, may shed light onto the meaning of the Assembly 
Clause in a way that an isolated debate of the First Congress never 
could.140 
Five state constitutions explicitly protected the assembly right 
prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights.141 The constitutions of 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire ensured that “[t]he people have a 
right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult 
upon the common good; give instructions to their representatives, and 
to request of the legislative body, by the way of addresses, petitions, 
or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them.”142 North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Vermont’s constitutions contained 
similar guarantees, providing that “the people have a right to 
assemble together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their 
Representatives, and to apply to the Legislature, for redress of 
grievances.”143 
The provisions in these five state constitutions bear striking 
resemblances to the version of the Assembly Clause adopted in the 
First Amendment. All recognized that the right to assemble is one of 
“the people.” The “orderly and peaceable” limitation in the 
constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire parallels the 
inclusion of “peaceably” in the First Amendment. Moreover, these 
early versions of the Assembly Clause have nothing to say about 
speech rights, which often found protection elsewhere.144 And 
 
 139. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 489, 501 (1977). 
 140. See, e.g., Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. 
REV. 989, 989 (1996) (“State charters are the foundation of American constitutional law.”). 
 141. It should be noted that a sixth state, South Carolina, also protected the assembly right, 
but only to the extent that the assembly was religious in nature: “No person shall disturb or 
molest any religious assembly . . . .” S.C. CONST. of 1778, art. XXXVIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, 
supra note 117, at 3257. 
 142. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. XIX, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 117, at 1892; 
see also N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. 1, § XXXII, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 117, at 
2457 (using nearly identical language). 
 143. N.C. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVIII, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra 
note 117, at 2788; see also PA. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. XVI, reprinted in 5 
THORPE, supra note 117, at 3084 (using nearly identical language, and providing that application 
for the redress of grievances might take place “by address, petition, or remonstrance”); VT. 
CONST. of 1777, ch.1, art. XVIII, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 117, at 3741 (same).  
 144. These speech rights were protected but often heavily qualified. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. 
of 1780, pt. I, art. XXI, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 117, at 1892 (“The freedom of 
deliberation, speech, and debate, in either house of the legislature, is so essential to the rights of 
the people, that it cannot be the foundation of any accusation or prosecution, action or 
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although all five link the right to assemble with the right to petition, 
these two rights were also kept separate: no reasonable interpretation 
of these provisions could find the right to assemble dependent on the 
act of petitioning the government, especially because the two rights 
are crisply demarcated by a comma or a semicolon. 
This evidence counsels that the Framers conceptualized the 
assembly right broadly, insofar as they chose not to dictate what an 
assembly ought to be about. Notably, however, these provisions do 
not extend protection to associations by their own terms. Moreover, 
two state constitutions included the kind of qualifying language—
assemblies must be “orderly and peaceable”145—that, as discussed 
above, does not have much of an application in the associational 
context.146 So though evidence from state constitutions demonstrates 
that the assembly right was thought to apply to any particular topic 
and to safeguard dissent, there is no reason to think that states 
understood the assembly right to protect notions of group autonomy. 
2. Founding-Era Assemblies.  Assemblies provided colonial 
Americans with a central tool as they went about their day-to-day 
lives and as they organized and framed their revolution against the 
English Crown.147 The sum of these experiences no doubt informed 
those who drafted the Assembly Clause. Colonial Americans lived 
their lives publicly, and, as a result, they relied on common areas to 
express themselves and to interact with others. Unsurprisingly, then, 
the Court has long recognized the important role public spaces have 
played in American life, noting that streets and parks have 
“immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time 
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”148 
Founding-era streets housed countless assemblies where people 
gathered as “‘mobs,’ rioters, soapbox orators, pamphleteers, 
 
complaint, in any other court or place whatsoever.” (emphasis added)); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 
1, art. XIV, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 117, at 3741 (“That the people have a right to 
freedom of speech, and of writing and publishing their sentiments; therefore, the freedom of the 
press ought not be restrained.”). 
 145. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 147. E.g., ZICK, supra note 37, at 26–27.  
 148. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).  
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proselytizers, provocateurs, and press agents.”149 The colonists used 
the streets to stage demonstrations against England in which 
protesters “marched, chanted, sang, and burned objects in effigy,”150 
engaging in public outcries that were “not only tolerated but 
generally supported.”151 These demonstrations were frequently 
spontaneous and contentious,152 but they rarely turned violent153 and 
often allowed marginalized groups such as women, free blacks, and 
servants to temporarily make their voices heard.154 Public riots thus 
served both as a “safety valve[] for defusing class tensions”155 and as 
an engine for rebellion against the British.156 Protests against the 
Stamp Act157 and the Tea Act158 numbered among the Revolution’s 
most memorable events—events that would have disappeared 
without the ability of citizens to gather in the streets.159 
Assemblies took place indoors, as well. Taverns were an 
especially central location for colonial political and social life.160 
Colonists often gathered in taverns to plot boycotts of British goods, 
read newspapers and political pamphlets, and discuss political affairs 
with out-of-town visitors.161 And although taverns were privately 
 
 149. ZICK, supra note 37, at 26.  
 150. Id. at 27. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 30. 
 153. Id. Riots did grow violent, however, when aimed at tax collectors or other officials 
representing the British, who suffered “[a]ssault, tarring and feathering, and binding.” Id. at 29.  
 154. Id. at 30. 
 155. Id. at 31. 
 156. See id. at 28 (“By facilitating the making of identity or representational claims and the 
participation of the common man in politics and self-governance, these common spaces helped 
propel Americans into the Revolution.”). 
 157. Stamp Act, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1765), repealed by 6 Geo. 3, c. 11 (1766); see also ZICK, 
supra note 37, at 28 (recounting a typical Stamp Act demonstration, which involved well-
organized, peaceful parades through town). 
 158. Tea Act, 13 Geo. 3, c. 44 (1773), repealed by Statute Law Revision Act, 1861, 24 & 25 
Vict., c. 101; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 37 (2002) 
(reporting that John Adams extolled the Boston Tea Party as “so bold, so daring, so firm, 
intrepid, and inflexible, and it must have so important consequences, and so lasting, that I can’t 
but consider it an epocha in history”). 
 159. See ZICK, supra note 37, at 30 (“[R]udimentary streets and town squares [were] critical 
to the revolutionary spirit and cause.”). 
 160. See Linnekin, supra note 121, at 599 (“The singular role that taverns played in 
facilitating public speech, discourse, and assembly prior to, during, and after the Revolutionary 
War simply cannot be overstated.”).  
 161. Id. at 601–05. 
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owned, they functioned as “quasi-public” spaces162 where “people 
assembled on a . . . regular basis to discuss political and other matters 
on the most egalitarian level.”163 
Both indoors and outdoors, then, colonists practiced their 
assembly rights in surprisingly spontaneous and inclusive ways.164 
Membership was fluid, debate vibrant, and dissent the order of the 
day. Whether in the streets or in the taverns, assembly facilitated a 
robust conversation among citizens of the founding generation, a 
force so powerful that it often cut across gender, race, and class.165 
Assembly was a shared public act during a moment of intense 
political upheaval, a “right of the people to bring wayward 
government to heel.”166 In this sense, assembly maintained a narrow 
and distinct meaning for the Framers,167 but it was also a right imbued 
with deep significance. It was assembly that gave voice to the 
Revolution, and it was assemblies “in convention”168 that brought that 
revolution to fruition when “We the People” ratified the 
Constitution.169 This right—a throwback to the classical republicanism 
of a bygone age where politics rested on virtue and civic 
responsibility170—was to be exercised during those “certain moments 
 
 162. Id. at 620. 
 163. Id. at 621. 
 164. To be sure, not all colonial assemblies had quite so heroic a pedigree, and not all were 
endorsed by the Framers. The Framers understood the need to prevent peaceful assemblies 
from descending into mobs based on firsthand experience, for example, with Shays’s Rebellion. 
WOOD, supra note 117, at 412–13.  
 165. ZICK, supra note 37, at 30; see also Linnekin, supra note 121, at 604 (“Long communal 
tables in taverns promoted interaction and discussion between disparate groups. Some taverns 
even catered to a racially integrated clientele.” (footnote omitted)).  
 166. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 26 
(1998). 
 167. For a description of the assembly right as both independent and in person, see supra 
Part I.C. 
 168. See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819) (“[B]y the convention, by congress, and by the state legislatures, 
the [Constitution] was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which 
they can act safely, effectively, and wisely on a subject, by assembling in convention.” (emphasis 
added)).  
 169. AMAR, supra note 166, at 26. 
 170. See MICHAEL LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES: TIME, THE CONSTITUTION, AND 
THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 155 (1988) (“Ultimately, [the 
Framers] saw the first ten amendments as a symbol, a source of political education, or a 
reminder to future citizens, not only of their rights, but also of their responsibilities. 
Antifederalists did not rely on progress to advance the cause of freedom. Instead they put their 
faith, what little of it they had, in the decency, and honesty, and public-mindedness of future 
citizens.”). 
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in history in which political action had special significance,”171 
moments where, as Alexander Hamilton sensationally put it, “the 
frail and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to 
crush us beneath its ruins.”172 So although members of the founding 
generation exercised their assembly rights every day—in streets, in 
taverns—they also understood those rights’ enduring revolutionary 
significance in enabling the people to erect a new constitutional and 
political order. 
III.  ASSEMBLY IN THE AGE OF OCCUPY 
What, then, should the Assembly Clause actually protect in 
practice? To answer this question, this Note turns to the Occupy 
movement. Social movements like Occupy play an important role in 
constitutional change by giving “nongovernmental actors an 
opportunity to talk back to institutions of power and to have a voice 
in the development of constitutional norms.”173 In the face of legal 
losses, such movements “give people a sense of . . . why they should 
be aggrieved by existing practices,”174 thereby “reorienting law to 
shifting social understandings.”175 Although Occupy did not often 
center its ambiguous calls for change on explicitly constitutional 
arguments, it nonetheless offered an invitation to think differently 
about the state of First Amendment law, both by the way in which its 
occupations were practiced and the way in which our legal regime 
caused them to end.176 
This Part begins with an examination of the many features 
shared by the Occupy movement and founding-era assemblies. 
Drawing on these parallels, it then considers how experiences with 
Occupy might inform judicial interpretation of the Assembly Clause. 
 
 171. Id. at 140. 
 172. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 at 113 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 173. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 927, 946 (2006). 
 174. Id. at 948. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Bruce Ackerman & Yochai Benkler, Occupying the First Amendment, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2011, 9:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bruce-
ackerman/occupy-wall-street-first-amendment-_b_1023709.html (“Whatever else it 
accomplishes, Occupy Wall Street is revealing distortions in our current understanding of the 
First Amendment.”); cf. Ilya Somin, Occupy Wall Street and Popular Constitutionalism, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/20/occupy-
wall-street-and-popular-constitutionalism (documenting emerging constitutional arguments 
made by Occupy protesters).  
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In so doing, it sketches out the existing jurisprudential framework for 
evaluating assembly rights, describes how courts have applied that 
framework to the Occupy movement, and articulates First 
Amendment and property-based doctrinal changes to more 
coherently operationalize the Assembly Clause as a freestanding, 
independent constitutional right. 
A. How To Occupy: Occupy Movements as Founding-Era 
Assemblies 
Occupy, like many founding-era assemblies, had an at best 
tenuous link to associational freedoms. To the contrary, Occupy 
protesters formed a heterogeneous group that lacked a formalized set 
of goals,177 criteria for membership,178 or a leadership class.179 And this 
was very much by design. Like those who gathered to protest the 
English Crown,180 the accept-all-comers Occupy movement did not 
seek a right to exclude or a right to rigidly police its own membership, 
the kind of rights that would feature prominently in a broader view of 
the Assembly Clause protective of expressive associations.181 In this 
sense, movements like Occupy risk slipping through the cracks of an 
Assembly Clause devoted to protecting associations, despite the fact 
that it is precisely this kind of movement the Framers crafted the 
Assembly Clause to safeguard. 
For example, Occupy’s reliance on parks and other common 
spaces would have been familiar to the Framers, who depended on 
such public and quasi-public areas to communicate political 
messages.182 And both Occupiers and members of the founding 
generation used similar tactics to relay their messages: colonial 
demonstrations often involved the kind of expressive conduct—
burning effigies or dumping tea into a harbor, for example183—that 
 
 177. See GITLIN, supra note 18, at 109 (“[W]hat was truly impossible to find in the vast 
reaches of the Occupy movement—for more than three months—was a single demand, or 
distinct package of them . . . .”).  
 178. Hence the slogan, “We are the 99 percent.” 
 179. To demonstrate just how leaderless its movement was, Occupy Denver elected Shelby, 
a three-year-old border collie, as its leader, observing that she was “more of a ‘person’ than a 
corporation.” GITLIN, supra note 18, at 100.  
 180. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 181. See INAZU, supra note 25, at 183 (“[T]he proper standard for determining the limits of 
group autonomy is through the right of assembly.”).  
 182. See ZICK, supra note 37, at 25–31 (detailing founding-era protests and demonstrations).  
 183. See id. (describing the methods of dissent employed by colonists); see also Eugene 
Volokh, Symbolic Expression and the Original Meaning of the First Amendment, 97 GEO. L.J. 
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Occupy put to use when staging its protests and constructing its 
encampments.184 
More fundamentally, though, Occupy evoked the specter of 
founding-era assemblies by calling for a thorough rethinking of the 
political order. Like the Antifederalists before them, Occupy 
protesters understood assembly as an element of civic responsibility,185 
a duty incumbent upon citizens to challenge what is orthodox. This 
was precisely the Framers’ aim when they spoke of assembly: to 
gather together during those moments when ordinary politics had 
failed and the pursuit of freedom required the people to chart a new 
course.186 
Occupy gave voice to those gathered at a time when many felt 
increasingly voiceless. It was, after all, the Great Recession’s social 
movement. Its tents and makeshift shelters, eerily reminiscent of the 
Hoovervilles of the 1930s,187 stood in solidarity with those victims of 
spiking home foreclosures.188 Its emphasis on shared sacrifice and the 
dignity of work189 contrasted sharply with the financial gymnastics that 
had left the American economy riddled with rising levels of income 
inequality190 and unemployment.191 And its internal politics, carefully 
 
1057, 1060 (2009) (“Framing-era English and American political culture was rich with symbolic 
expression, used interchangeably with words.”). 
 184. See Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247 (D. Conn. 2012) (“The 
Occupy movement . . . aims to exemplify its message: to express the desire that the economically 
disenfranchised become more central to American public life by literally placing the 
economically disenfranchised in the center of America's public spaces.”). 
 185. Cf. supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 187. Michael Muskal, Occupy Wall Street Camps Are Today’s Hoovervilles, L.A. TIMES: 
NATION NOW (Nov. 15, 2011, 10:46 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/
2011/11/occupy-wall-street-hoovervilles.html. 
 188. See Robbie Whelan, Faces of the Home Foreclosure Crisis, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2010, 
8:21 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704610904576031632838153532.html 
(“At the start of 2008, with the U.S. economy weakening and job losses multiplying, the defaults 
[on mortgages] began to spread as millions of Americans . . . ran into trouble making their 
payments.”).  
 189. See Jed Purdy, Observations from Occupy Wall Street, FIELDWORK (Oct. 23, 2011, 8:44 
AM), http://jedfieldwork.blogspot.com/2011/10/observations-from-occupy-wall-street.html (“Do 
it yourself . . . is an aesthetic and also an ethic, which the Occupiers are trying to take from the 
personal to the social scale.”). 
 190. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007 ix (2011), available at http://cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/10-25-HouseholdIncome.pdf (noting that for the top 1 percent of all 
income earners, household income grew by 275 percent from 1979 to 2007, while the bottom 20 
percent of all income earners saw household incomes rise by only 18 percent over the same time 
period). 
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guided by “facilitators” who made sure everyone had the opportunity 
to be heard,192 defied the partisan rancor that had become 
Washington’s way.193 It disseminated its message virtually,194 but it 
lived its message in person. As one protester put it, “[Occupy] calls us 
with a single unspoken but implicit demand: participate!”195 
B. Occupy and the Right To Peaceably Assemble 
The courts that evaluated the legal challenges brought by 
Occupy protesters consolidated widespread losses for the 
movement.196 If the Occupy cases demonstrate that First Amendment 
law is increasingly out of step with what is going on in the world, 
advocates and other participants in our legal system must begin to 
creatively rethink the principles that allowed a movement with so 
much to say to end so quickly. To disrupt the doctrine, we must 
understand how it operates, why it fails to work, and how it might be 
changed. As a matter of legal strategy, the best course of action may 
be to look outside the complicated maze of free speech law and 
instead craft arguments in an area better suited—textually and 
historically—to both regulate and safeguard dissent. In short, we must 
rethink assembly. 
1. The Current Paradigm: Assembly as Speech.  By ignoring the 
right to assemble, courts must squeeze their arguments regarding 
assemblies like Occupy into the confines of free speech jurisprudence. 
Because the First Amendment protects the freedom of speech, to find 
protection under the free speech framework, the expression must 
necessarily constitute speech. If a given case does not involve 
 
 191. In September 2011, when the Occupy movement began, an estimated fourteen million 
Americans were out of work, and the unemployment rate stood at 9.1 percent. News Release, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, The Employment Situation — September 2011 
(Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_10072011.pdf.  
 192. GITLIN, supra note 18, at 104 (“Facilitators kept up conversation, inhibited big talkers 
and big interruptions, [and] kept conflicts manageable.”). 
 193. See, e.g., Vote Studies 2011, in Graphics, CONG. Q. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://media.cq.com/
media/2011/votestudy_2011/graphics/ (“In the House, a record percentage of votes divided the 
two parties [in 2011], and Republicans voted with their caucus at a record rate. Senate 
Democrats also set a record for voting together.”). 
 194. See GITLIN, supra note 18, at 5 (describing Occupy’s use of social media). 
 195. Id. at 74. 
 196. See Sarah Kunstler, The Right To Occupy—Occupy Wall Street and the First 
Amendment, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 989, 1019 (2012) (documenting the “string of recent 
defeats faced by the Occupy movement in the courts”).  
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“speech,” the moving party has no basis upon which to launch a First 
Amendment challenge.197 
Conduct, of course, is not speech.198 But the Court has recognized 
that some conduct may be so expressive as to constitute a form of 
speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.199 Such 
expression must demonstrate an “intent to convey a particularized 
message”200 and, given the context in which it occurs, “the likelihood 
[must be] great that the message would be understood by those who 
viewed it.”201 The message must also be “created by the conduct 
itself,”202 not “by [explanatory] speech that accompanies it.”203 
Laws regulating conduct that satisfies this standard and that are 
applied because of the “likely communicative impact”204 of the 
expression are evaluated under strict scrutiny;205 that is, to survive a 
First Amendment challenge, such laws must be “necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest [and] narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”206 
In contrast, generally applicable laws justified without reference to 
the communicative impact of the expression are evaluated using a 
distinct form of intermediate scrutiny that requires such content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulations to be “narrowly drawn to 
 
 197. The Court has outlined a number of categorical exceptions that do not constitute a part 
of the freedom of speech. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (threats); New 
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (child pornography); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 
23 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (incitement); 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (defamation); Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949) (speech that constitutes an integral part of criminal 
conduct); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words). 
 198. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“We cannot accept the 
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person 
engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Black, 538 U.S. at 347–48 (cross burning); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & 
Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 568 (1995) (parades); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
399 (1989) (flag burning); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65–66 (1981) (nude 
dancing); Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61–63 (1970) (theatrical performances); Tinker 
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (wearing black wristbands); 
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369–70 (1931) (flag waving).  
 200. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam).  
 201. Id. at 411.  
 202. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006).  
 203. Id.  
 204. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411.  
 205. See, e.g., id. at 412 (applying strict scrutiny to a Texas statute criminalizing the 
desecration of the American flag that was invoked “because of the content of the message [flag 
burning] conveyed”). 
 206. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
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further a substantial governmental interest”207 and to “preserve[] 
ample alternative channels of communication.”208 
This seemingly rigorous intermediate-scrutiny standard is, in 
practice, quite feeble, and the Court has largely eviscerated any of its 
potential force. First, the narrow-tailoring analysis in this context is 
decidedly dissimilar from how it is conducted under strict scrutiny. 
The test does not require the regulation to be the least restrictive 
means of accomplishing the government interest,209 and it does not 
evaluate the underinclusiveness of the regulation,210 both of which 
strict scrutiny demands. Second, the “ample alternative channels” 
prong is a flimsy guarantee, requiring the government to show only 
that it has left open “other ways” of communicating the message, 
even if those ways are significantly less effective.211 This standard is 
particularly problematic when evaluating expressive conduct because 
there is always another way to communicate the message: by speaking 
rather than acting.212 
Indeed, the free speech framework often mistakes expressive 
conduct—a term with no hook in the Constitution’s text—for 
assembly. Political demonstrations,213 overnight campouts designed to 
raise awareness for the problem of homelessness,214 and parades,215 for 
example, have all been reviewed under the guise of expressive 
conduct without so much as a nod to what they really are—
assemblies. This mischaracterization matters because although 
content-neutral regulations of expressive conduct were once thought 
to merit exacting scrutiny,216 they are now evaluated using the same 
 
 207. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).  
 208. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988). 
 209. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (noting that content-neutral 
regulations “need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of achieving the 
government’s interests). 
 210. City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 811 n.28 (1984) (citing approval of 
a content-neutral statute despite its admittedly underinclusive nature). 
 211. Clark, 468 U.S. at 295; see also Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483 (upholding a content-neutral 
statute so long as it permits “the more general dissemination of a message”). 
 212. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 295 (stressing the existence of ample alternative means of 
conveying the message—including signs and demonstrations—as grounds for upholding a ban 
on overnight sleeping in a park to draw attention to the plight of the homeless). 
 213. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 214. Clark, 468 U.S. at 289, 293. 
 215. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 566 
(1995).  
 216. See, e.g., O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77 (requiring the government interest offered to 
justify regulations on expressive speech to be “compelling; substantial; . . . [or] paramount” 
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test applied to content-neutral regulations of speech.217 For 
regulations of expressive conduct, then, the government has a 
relatively low bar to clear.218 
In sum, courts are using the wrong classification and the wrong 
test; instead of relying on expressive conduct and intermediate 
scrutiny, courts would do well to think more carefully about the 
assembly right and how it should be put into practice. 
2. The Occupy Cases.  The Occupy movement faced a variety of 
hurdles under this legal regime, so an analysis of the judicial opinions 
evaluating Occupy’s First Amendment claims is thus beneficial to 
further understand why free speech jurisprudence fails to capture the 
essence of assembly. 
To begin, the threshold determination—whether Occupy 
movements, with their tent cities and around-the-clock occupations of 
public spaces, engaged in expressive conduct—remains very much an 
open question. The Supreme Court evaluated a similar movement 
that relied on camping and sleeping in public parks to raise awareness 
for the plight of the homeless roughly two decades before the Occupy 
movement.219 In that case, the Court found the erection of tents in 
public parks to communicate a message, but it assumed without 
deciding that individuals sleeping in those tents engaged in symbolic 
speech sufficiently expressive to give rise to a First Amendment 
claim.220 
The Occupiers largely succeeded on this count. Some courts, 
following the Supreme Court’s lead, assumed but did not decide that 
 
(footnotes omitted)); cf. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160–62 (1939) (striking down a 
ban on leafleting and requiring courts to “be astute to examine the effect” of legislation 
burdening First Amendment rights and uphold such regulations only when the state can 
demonstrate “substantial[]” reasons for doing so).  
 217. Clark, 468 U.S. at 298 (noting that constitutional standards “for validating a regulation 
of expressive conduct [are] little, if any, different from the standard applied to time, place, or 
manner restrictions”). 
 218. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We 
have never invalidated the application of a general law simply because the conduct that it 
reached was being engaged in for expressive purposes and the government could not 
demonstrate a sufficiently important state interest.”). 
 219. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 291–92. 
 220. Id. at 293; cf. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (taking a similar approach by assuming without 
deciding that burning a draft card has a “communicative element . . . sufficient to bring into play 
the First Amendment”).  
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overnight sleeping in Occupy camps constituted expressive conduct.221 
Others, however, went further to explicitly hold that sleeping—in the 
context of the Occupy movement—demonstrated an intent to 
communicate a message likely to be understood by viewers that 
would merit First Amendment protection.222 
Despite having survived the initial inquiry, Occupy movements 
across the country lost their legal challenges under the weight of 
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations.223 These 
regulations—which often banned the erection of buildings or 
structures (like tents) or the use of parks after a certain time of 
night224—were almost always found to have been applied without 
reference to the message communicated by the Occupy movement,225 
 
 221. E.g., Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d. 1110, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 
2012).  
 222. See, e.g., Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 246–47 (D. Conn. 2012) 
(“[T]he tents which Occupy members have erected and inhabited, and even the act of sleeping 
in those tents, are themselves forms of expression . . . . One would have to have lived in a bubble 
for the past year to accept Defendants’ claim that Occupy’s tents [do not relay a message].”); 
Watters v. Otter, 854 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 (D. Idaho 2012) (“The act of sleeping in the tents 
conveys a message of personal commitment and sacrifice to the political cause that is not 
conveyed by the tent city alone. Political messages gain power by virtue of personal 
commitment and sacrifice. And while sleeping isolated from context is perhaps the least 
expressive activity imaginable, it becomes imbued with great meaning as used by Occupy 
Boise.”). 
 223. See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text. It should also be noted that government 
regulations undergo different levels of scrutiny depending on where the First Amendment 
activity in question takes place. Public parks, which housed many Occupy camps, exemplify the 
traditional public forum, that is, “government property that has traditionally been available for 
public expression.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). 
First Amendment activity taking place in a traditional public forum is evaluated using the same 
test as when the government acts as sovereign: the corresponding level of scrutiny is applied 
depending on whether the law is content neutral or content based. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. 
Ct. 1207, 1218 (2011) (discussing the content-based versus content-neutral distinction in the 
context of the traditional public forum). Some Occupy camps—Zuccotti Park, for example—
took place in privately owned parks opened for public use. Courts have avoided the messy 
public-forum questions raised by such public-private arrangements by assuming without 
deciding that even privately owned parks are traditional public forums when opened to the 
public. See, e.g., Waller v. City of New York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). The 
Occupy cases have thus been uniformly evaluated in the context of a traditional public forum, 
where the classic content-based/content-neutral categorization remains in full force. For a 
discussion of the various approaches to the intersection of First Amendment and property law 
under the Assembly Clause, see infra Part III.B.4. 
 224. E.g., Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
 225. Some courts, upon examining more closely park regulations and city ordinances, have 
concluded that, although content neutral on their face, such regulations were content based as 
applied to Occupy protesters. In this relatively rare scenario, Occupiers were able to overcome 
threats of eviction from public spaces. See Watters, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 829 (noting that “content-
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allowing courts to apply the deferential intermediate-scrutiny 
standard.226 The various park regulations that stymied the movement’s 
around-the-clock occupation of public spaces easily satisfied 
intermediate scrutiny. As one court candidly remarked, intermediate 
scrutiny “is not a particularly burdensome hurdle [for the 
government] to clear.”227 
This analysis took place in three steps. First, courts reasoned that 
the government had a substantial interest in preserving the 
appearance228 and the safety229 of its public parks. Second, regulations 
prohibiting structures, overnight sleeping, or camping were found to 
be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.230 Third, and perhaps 
most problematic for the Occupiers, courts held that the content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulations of public parks left open 
ample alternative channels of communication because they allowed 
protesters to use the parks during the day and to avail themselves of 
other methods of communication, namely, speaking.231 
3. Rethinking Assembly.  The central irony of applying content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulations in the assembly context is 
that the power of assemblies to relay a message comes from precisely 
those aspects of dissent the government seeks to regulate: decisions 
about how and where assemblies assert their First Amendment rights 
carry enormous communicative power. The importance of these 
tactical choices is all the more central in the assembly context because 
those assembling are often dissenting.232 To land the most powerful 
 
based enforcement is just as pernicious as content-based wording”); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 
866 F. Supp. 2d 545, 561 (D.S.C. 2011) (holding that an unwritten, no-camping policy that had 
never been applied to any person or group before the Occupy movement was content based); cf. 
Occupy Fort Myers v. City of Fort Myers, 882 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1335 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (striking 
down as facially content-based park regulations that permitted an extension of park hours only 
for “sporting events, cultural activities or civic activities”).  
 226. See Watters, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 830 (“[T]he closer the facts in this case get to the facts in 
Clark, the weaker Occupy[’s] case becomes.”). 
 227. Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
 228. E.g., Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d. 1110, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 
2012) (citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984)). 
 229. E.g., Mitchell, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
 230. E.g., Occupy Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d. at 1118–20. 
 231. E.g., Occupy Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, 866 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1071 (D. Minn. 
2011).  
 232. See INAZU, supra note 25, at 21 (identifying three kinds of assembly: “the dissenting, 
the political, and the expressive”); id. at 156 (“Assembly—like speech, or the press, or 
religion—is most relevant when its exercise is challenged by the state.”); see also Martin v. 
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punch, these marginalized groups rely on healthy doses of imagery 
and symbolism to color their cause and lend salience to their 
arguments. To conclude, then, this Note will offer an initial 
framework for better protecting such activity under the Assembly 
Clause. The aim here is not to detail a comprehensive theory or set of 
doctrines that can conclusively give meaning to the assembly right; 
rather, it has the more modest goal of beginning a conversation about 
the contours of Assembly Clause jurisprudence and identifying 
avenues for future research and scholarship. 
First, evaluating claims under the Assembly Clause would no 
longer require courts to determine whether the conduct of a given 
assembly is expressive enough to merit First Amendment protection. 
If the Assembly Clause is understood to protect in-person gatherings, 
identifying an assembly will be a relatively straightforward task for 
courts. Physicality would be the touchstone—the assembly would 
need only to be a gathering of multiple individuals to trigger the 
potential for the Clause’s protection.233 As in the free speech 
context,234 assemblies gathered to discuss matters of public concern 
would exemplify the core of what the Clause protects,235 but this 
recognition would not preclude nonpolitical assemblies from bringing 
a cognizable claim.236 This question could be difficult at the margins, 
for example, when thinking about the assembly rights of online 
groups237 and the potential for assemblies to engage in constitutionally 
unprotected incitement238 or criminal conduct.239 On the whole, 
 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (characterizing methods of public dissent and expression as 
“essential to the poorly financed causes of little people”). 
 233. See supra Part I. 
 234. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The maintenance of the 
opportunity for free political discussion [is] an opportunity essential to the security of the 
Republic, [and] is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”). 
 235. This approach would comport with the historical understanding of the Assembly 
Clause. See supra Part II.C.2.  
 236. For example, a city ordinance limiting the use of dance halls to teenagers between the 
ages of fourteen and eighteen would infringe on the assembly right despite the entirely apolitical 
nature of dance halls. The Court has upheld such an ordinance, reasoning that it did not burden 
the right of association. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 28 (1989). Under the approach 
advocated here, such activity—neither speech nor association—would easily satisfy the 
Assembly Clause’s threshold condition (that the activity constitute an assembly), and a court 
would go on to apply some form of means-end scrutiny to evaluate the ordinance. 
 237. See generally John D. Inazu, Virtual Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1093 (2013) 
(exploring the extent to which online groups might find protection under the Assembly Clause). 
 238. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (defining the test for 
incitement in the free speech context). 
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however, this approach would hew closer to the Constitution’s text 
and history by recognizing assemblies as assemblies, not as speech or 
associations. 
Second, courts would then evaluate burdens on the assembly 
right using some form of means-end scrutiny. Such a framework could 
resemble the one at play in the Court’s free speech jurisprudence, but 
it would require some significant modifications. The distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral regulations that features 
so prominently in the free speech context could plausibly be 
maintained for assembly cases. Courts would have to police that line 
with special vigilance, however. As several Occupy cases 
demonstrate, assemblies are particularly vulnerable to facially 
content-neutral laws that are nonetheless applied in content-based 
ways.240 The consequence of ignoring this possibility is likely outcome 
determinative. Assemblies are afforded significantly reduced 
protection under intermediate scrutiny than under strict scrutiny,241 a 
standard the government has satisfied only once in the free speech 
context.242 Without courts to conduct a probing examination of the 
facts and procedural history of a given case, dissenting assemblies like 
Occupy risk suppression because of the content of their message, 
especially if courts continue to adhere to the content-based/content-
neutral categorization in the context of the Assembly Clause. 
Third, the intermediate-scrutiny inquiry could also be altered to 
better account for the reliance of assemblies on the time, place, and 
manner of their gatherings to relay a message. Those who physically 
assemble to voice their political beliefs disproportionately bear the 
burden of the intermediate-scrutiny standard because it threatens to 
overly restrict the one form of communication accessible to all, 
regardless of wealth: the use of our voices and our bodies to relay a 
 
 239. The Clause’s “peaceably” limitation would preclude, for example, conspiracies or street 
gangs from gaining constitutional protection under the Assembly Clause. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 240. Indeed, some courts evaluating the First Amendment challenges brought by Occupy 
protesters recognized well the importance of ensuring that content-neutral regulations—such as 
no-camping policies—were not used to single out Occupy’s conduct because of its expressive 
nature. See supra note 225 and accompanying text; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 
(1989); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
373–74 (1886) (recognizing that, in the Equal Protection Clause context, even a race-neutral law 
can be race conscious as applied). 
 241. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 242. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010) (upholding a federal 
ban on legal services and advice to terrorist organizations against a First Amendment 
challenge). 
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message.243 The existence of ample alternative channels, for example, 
may be out of reach for the poor who cannot afford access to radio 
waves, television screens, or the Internet to broadcast their views. In 
the long run, then, seemingly innocuous content-neutral regulations 
can effectuate a type of viewpoint discrimination244 by systematically 
excluding dissenting opinions from the marketplace of ideas in favor 
of those messages put forward by well-funded political candidates, 
corporations, and media conglomerates, all of whom often have an 
interest in preserving the status quo.245 
And even assuming protesters could afford access to such 
resources, those methods of communication would hardly provide 
them with meaningful ample alternative channels to be heard. Speech 
via social media, for example, simply does not carry the same 
emotional power as the kind of physical assembly—and the sustained 
personal sacrifice it entails—that protesters so often lend to their 
cause. This sacrifice is one that, in the context of the Occupy 
movement, at least, provided the driving force behind the 
movement’s ability to garner national media attention.246 
 
 243. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 313 n.14 (1984) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[J]udicial administration of the First Amendment, in conjunction 
with a social order marked by large disparities in wealth and other sources of power, tends 
systematically to discriminate against efforts by the relatively disadvantaged to convey their 
political ideas.”). 
 244. Viewpoint discrimination occurs when “government allows one message while 
prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond.” Rosenberger v. 
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992) (describing viewpoint discrimination as 
occurring when the government uses its “authority to license one side of a debate to fight 
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules”). It might be 
argued that viewpoint discrimination cannot exist under these circumstances because the 
government has simply remained neutral with respect to income disparities that affect an 
individual’s ability to communicate his ideas and has thus in no way skewed public debate one 
way or another. That said, such disparities arguably implicate state action because a “state’s 
contract and property laws always help determine one’s freedom of speech [by] determin[ing] 
access to the means of communication, [which is a function of] economic power.” J.M. Balkin, 
Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 375, 412.  
 245. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 244, at 379 (“[T]he paradigmatic example of free speech in 
this country is the parroting of values created for us by those groups and persons who have 
sufficient money and clout to monopolize our attentions and ultimately our very 
imaginations.”). 
 246. See Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 252–53 (D. Conn. 2012) (“The 
City argues that the Occupy protesters are able to get their message out through Facebook, 
Twitter, and the Occupy New Haven website. . . . There is something unsatisfying about telling a 
movement that aims to make visible an often unseen, ignored population that it should content 
itself with forms of communication that are only seen when someone seeks them out.”). 
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How to better account for these disparities in the assembly 
context? Courts would do well to adopt a more probing posture when 
evaluating content-neutral laws, recognizing that the government 
always has “strong incentives to overregulate even in the absence of 
an intent to censor particular views.”247 In fashioning a revised means-
end scrutiny analysis for the Assembly Clause, courts could alter the 
ample alternative channels prong to require a more persuasive 
government showing that the individuals whose assembly rights are 
burdened by a given law have a realistic opportunity to effectively 
express their messages elsewhere or through other means. Moreover, 
a more skeptical approach to the narrow tailoring analysis could do 
some work by requiring the government to empirically demonstrate 
that its asserted interests will actually be advanced by the given 
regulation,248 or by preventing the government from stifling an 
assembly with an underinclusive law.249 
4. Assembly as Access.  Courts could also look to the intersection 
of First Amendment and property law to give meaning to the 
Assembly Clause. First, a caveat: speech and property enjoy a 
notoriously complex relationship.250 That relationship cannot be fully 
illuminated here. It can, however, be reframed. In light of its text and 
its history, the Assembly Clause more directly implicates the First 
Amendment’s property foundations than the Free Speech Clause. A 
right to assemble, after all, presupposes the ability to access a place 
where that assembly can occur.251 Moreover, the Clause’s use of the 
adverb “peaceably” suggests that though there are identifiable limits 
on the right to assemble, the assembly right also imposes an 
affirmative obligation on the government to ensure that assemblies 
can form in the first place.252 
 
 247. Clark, 468 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 248. See, e.g., id. at 311–12 (“The majority cites no evidence indicating that sleeping engaged 
in as symbolic speech will cause substantial wear and tear on park property.”). 
 249. As noted above, the intermediate-scrutiny standard permits the use of underinclusive 
legislation in the free speech context. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
 250. E.g., Joseph Blocher, Government Property and Government Speech, 52 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1413, 1420 (2011) (“The relationship between property and expression is even more 
important, and more complicated, than it first appears.”). 
 251. See Michael W. McConnell, Freedom by Association, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2012, at 
39, 41 (“A right of assembly without a right of access to public spaces would be an empty 
right. . . . The creation of the freedom of assembly embodied [a] legal change in the right of 
access.” (emphasis added)). 
 252. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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This approach could guarantee access to public property for the 
purpose of exercising the assembly right, creating what has been 
described as a “First-Amendment easement”253 against the 
government. Such a right of access is already embodied in the Court’s 
public-forum doctrine, which has long recognized the right of the 
people to use streets, parks, and other common spaces for expressive 
activity.254 That said, the Court has been unwilling to expand the scope 
of the traditional public forum in recent cases, making it an 
improbable vehicle for legal change.255 Unsaddled with the Free 
Speech Clause’s cumbersome legal framework, the Assembly Clause 
could provide an important textual hook for advancing access to 
certain government-owned property opened to the public, property 
that currently falls outside the ambit of traditional public-forum 
analysis.256 The Court has, for example, sharply curtailed the scope of 
permissible expressive activity in airport terminals,257 on roads and 
footpaths designated for public use within military bases,258 and on 
 
 253. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. 
CT. REV. 1, 13 (“When the citizen goes to the street, he is exercising an immemorial right of a 
free man, a kind of First-Amendment easement.”); cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“Freedom of expression would not truly exist if the right could 
be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for 
crackpots. . . . [W]e do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a 
telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet . . . .”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: 
Speech in Public Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 238 (observing that “access to public property 
for speech purposes is essential to effective exercise of First Amendment rights”).  
 254. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (classifying residential streets as 
public fora); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (holding that 
individuals have the right to use “streets and parks for communication of views”). 
 255. Compare Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) 
(holding that an airport is not a traditional public forum because “the rather short history of air 
transport . . . does not demonstrate that airports have historically been made available for 
speech activity”), with id. at 695 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[The majority’s] analysis is flawed 
at its very beginning. It leaves the government with almost unlimited authority to restrict speech 
on its property by doing nothing more than articulating a non-speech-related purpose for the 
area, and it leaves almost no scope for the development of new public forums absent the rare 
approval of the government.”). 
 256. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985) 
(holding that “[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting 
limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public 
discourse”). 
 257. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 680. 
 258. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1976) (denying individuals a “generalized 
constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets” at military installations as a 
result of “the special constitutional function of the military in our national life”). 
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property outside of public high schools259 and jails,260 denying 
dissenters access to fora where, in today’s increasingly urbanized 
landscape,261 they may have the best opportunity to meaningfully 
relay their message to others. 
This march toward the minimization of assembly rights has not 
gone unnoticed, and a series of vigorous dissents have criticized the 
Court’s propensity to overvalue the extent of the government interest 
in preventing expressive access to such property262 and to undervalue 
the important First Amendment interests such access would 
preserve.263 But the Justices have largely waged these wars on the free 
speech battlefield, despite the fact that many of the First 
Amendment’s most contested cases involve the paradigmatic exercise 
of the assembly right: the physical, in-person gathering of multiple 
individuals seeking to voice their political views.264 It is the Assembly 
Clause that can provide these dissenting groups with what the Free 
Speech Clause cannot: a textual and historical basis for a First 
Amendment easement on public property. 
That is not to say, of course, that such access is without bound. 
To begin, the source of the access right—the peaceably term—is also 
its limit,265 meaning that violent assemblies of the kind so often found 
during the Occupy Oakland movement266 could be constitutionally 
restricted. And content-neutral regulations on such access—
regulations used to protect public health and safety, for example—
 
 259. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397, 400 (2007) (permitting over a First Amendment 
challenge the confiscation of a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” from a student 
attending a rally on the street outside of a public high school). 
 260. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 40–41, 47 (1966) (allowing the prosecution of college 
students gathered in front of a jail to protest against its policy of racial segregation despite a 
First Amendment challenge). 
 261. See generally ZICK, supra note 37 (describing the loss of shared outdoor spaces in the 
United States over the course of the twentieth century). 
 262. See, e.g., Greer, 424 U.S. at 851–52 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s opinion 
speaks in absolutes, exalting the need for military preparedness and admitting of no careful and 
solicitous accommodation of First Amendment interests to the competing concerns that all 
concede are substantial. . . . [T]he First Amendment does not evaporate with the mere 
intonation of interests such as national defense, military necessity, or domestic security.”).  
 263. See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Among other things, the 
Court’s ham-handed, categorical approach is deaf to the constitutional imperative to permit 
unfettered debate, even among high school students, about the wisdom of the war on drugs or of 
legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.”). 
 264. See supra notes 257–60. 
 265. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 266. See Mahler, supra note 1, at 41–42 (documenting violent Occupy Oakland protests). 
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would remain valid absent evidence they were content based as 
applied. The government, after all, need not tolerate anarchy to 
further the aims of the Assembly Clause.267 That said, threadbare 
assertions of a state interest in preventing individuals from gathering 
in public spaces, especially with respect to those seeking to use such 
spaces to express political views, should not satisfy the First 
Amendment’s demands. If the Assembly Clause were to ensure some 
minimum level of access to such government-owned property for 
expressive purposes, the right of citizens to gather publicly in 
dissent—the Clause’s central aim—would be substantially more 
robust indeed. 
Others have argued that the Assembly Clause could empower 
the government to subsidize expressive activity or to permit a First 
Amendment easement against private landowners who hold their 
property open to the public.268 For a brief time, the Court authorized a 
First Amendment right of access onto privately owned property that 
was sufficiently public in nature.269 These cases—which threatened to 
stretch the state-action doctrine to a breaking point270—have since 
been overruled, although states can and do, under their state 
constitutions, allow an expressive right of access to privately owned, 
publicly open spaces such as shopping malls or university campuses.271 
 
 267. See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“There may be 
some public places which are so clearly committed to other purposes that their use for the airing 
of grievances is anomalous. . . . No one, for example, would suggest that the Senate gallery is the 
proper place for a vociferous protest rally. . . . But this is quite different from saying that all 
public places are off limits to people with grievances. And it is farther yet from saying that the 
‘custodian’ of the public property in his discretion can decide when public places shall be used 
for the communication of ideas, especially the constitutional right to assemble . . . .” (citations 
omitted)).  
 268. See Balkin, supra note 244, at 402 (“Once we understand that the problem of access is a 
problem of both private and public power, several alternative solutions present themselves.”).  
 269. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 509 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
U.S. 308, 309 (1968) (protecting under the First Amendment the right of groups to peacefully 
picket on a privately owned shopping center), abrogated by Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 
(1976). 
 270. But see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (“Conduct that is formally ‘private’ 
may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental 
character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action.”). 
 271. As noted above, some state courts have, under their state constitutions, permitted a 
right of access for expressive activity onto certain private property that is open to the public in 
defining the contours of the public-forum doctrine and the common law of trespass. See, e.g., 
Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979) (holding that “sections 2 and 
3 of article I of the California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, 
in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned”), aff’d on other grounds, 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (upholding a state constitutional 
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Adopting this approach under the Assembly Clause could be a 
particularly effective way of safeguarding the assembly right, 
especially in the face of the increasing privatization of public spaces 
throughout the country. Some Occupy movements, for example, took 
place in privately owned parks open for public use.272 Courts 
evaluating First Amendment challenges under such circumstances 
assumed without deciding that such property is sufficiently public to 
fall within the ambit of the First Amendment.273 An explicit access 
right to private property that is held open to the public would remove 
the need for such an assumption and treat such quasi-public property 
as fully implicating First Amendment rights. 
CONCLUSION 
If the First Amendment is to continue to provide space for 
dissent—for those who would call upon society to rethink our 
constitutional and political order—courts, legal scholars, and 
advocates alike must be willing to meaningfully extend First 
Amendment principles beyond the realm of speech and association. 
Assemblies like Occupy Wall Street have grabbed the attention of 
our ongoing national conversation only to sink away under the weight 
of legal challenges, despite the text and history of the Assembly 
Clause, which was specifically designed to safeguard the integrity of 
such movements. This incongruity demands a renewed effort to 
analyze the assembly right as an assembly right, one that both 
empowers and regulates those who physically gather to make their 
voices heard, as all those seeking meaningful change must. 
 
right of access to shopping malls against a free speech and a Takings Clause challenge under the 
federal constitution); Wood v. State, No. 00-0644-MMM-A, 2003 WL 1955433, at *3 (Fla. Cir. 
Ct. Feb. 26, 2003) (permitting public right of access to privately owned shopping malls to seek 
signatures to place a political candidate’s name on the ballot); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, 
Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 590–91 (Mass. 1983) (same); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. 
J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994) (permitting public access to privately owned 
shopping malls to voice political views); Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 
108, 110 (Wash. 1981) (en banc) (same). See generally Curtis J. Berger, PruneYard Revisited: 
Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633 (1991) (detailing tensions between 
First Amendment and private property rights). Federal constitutional law, however, does not 
recognize First Amendment access to private property. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 
569 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not require a “dedication of private 
property to public use”). Occupy movements, which sometimes set up camp on private 
property, have challenged the limits of this principle. See supra note 223. 
 272. See supra note 223. 
 273. See supra note 223. 
